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Beyond	Sectarianism?	Transnational	Identity	Politics
&	Conflict	in	the	Modern	Middle	East:	Pasts,	Presents,
Futures
By	Jessica	Watkins
Sectarian	violence	is	decreasing	across	the	Middle	East,	if	largely	due	to	mass	displacement	and	harsh	settlements
imposed	in	states	emerging	from	conflict.	Alongside	this	decrease,	an	aggressive	strain	of	transnational	sectarian
politics	which	has	gripped	the	region	for	the	past	few	decades	is	abating,	at	least	for	now.	But	while	in	principle,	this
lull	creates	a	space	for	alternative	forms	of	collective	action	to	emerge,	in	practice,	the	region	remains	bound	to	the
identity	politics	that	have	permeated	its	international	relations	for	the	better	part	of	a	century.
Identity	politics	–	both	domestic	and	transnational	–	are	frequently	held	accountable	for	the	region’s	longstanding
susceptibility	to	conflict.	When	drawing	borders	after	World	War	I,	colonial	powers	showed	little	regard	for	existing
sub	and	supra-state	ethnic	and	religious	identities.		Roughly	60%	of	the	Middle	East	population	speak	Arabic	and
consider	themselves	to	be	Arab;	90%	are	Muslim	and	85%	of	those	identify	themselves	as	Sunni.
As	a	result,	the	Middle	East	is	unique	in	the	extent	to	which	political	actors	have	historically	been	able	to	emphasise
particular	traits	of	group	identity	to	appeal	to	populations	in	other	states.	Identity	politics	are	used	across	borders	in
order	to	forge	constituencies,	attract	patrons,	and	generally	leverage	support	in	direct	bids	to	undermine	state
sovereignty.	In	the	process,	non-Arab,	non-Muslim,	or	non-Sunni/Shi’a	designated	‘enemies’	are	alienated.
Within	the	past	15	years,	Sunni	versus	Shi’a	sectarian	narratives	of	conflict	have	seemingly	displaced	more
inclusive	forms	of	pan-Arab	and	pan-Islamist	identity	politics	at	the	regional	level.	Clearly,	this	has	only	been
possible	due	to	the	societal	dynamics	and	demographics	of	conflicted	states	including	Syria,	Yemen,	Iraq	and
Bahrain.	Rival	domestic	claimants	for	public	authority	have	politicised	what	were	previously	banal	markers	of
religious	identity,	with	agendas	and	insecurities	of	external	players	crystalising	divisions.
The	recent	surge	in	transnational	sectarian	politics	is	a	function	of	both	state	and	non-state	actors.	The	ideational
rivalry	between	the	Iranian	and	Saudi	leaderships	post-1979	has	revolved	around	their	respective	claims	to
champion	pan-Islamist	causes.	While	these	efforts	achieved	some	measure	of	success	when	confronting	non-
Muslim	‘enemies’	(e.g.	Israel	and	the	invading	Soviet	forces	in	Afghanistan),	they	have	been	less	tenable	with
respect	to	internal	conflicts	within	Muslim	states,	where	fault	lines	have	often	emerged	along	sectarian	divisions.
At	a	societal	level,	the	region-wide	rise	of	radical	militant	Salafi	jihadism	has	come	in	the	context	of	political	Islamist
groups	failing	to	achieve	rule	peacefully	within	the	existing	state	system	framework.	While	Salafism	has	always
been	particular	to	Sunni	Islam,	the	vision	of	an	Islamic	caliphate	put	forward	by	Al-Qa’ida	was	initially	premised	on
the	inclusion	of	all	Muslims,	irrespective	of	sect.	The	2005	declaration	of	all-out	war	against	the	Iraqi	Shi’a	by	former
Al-Qa’ida	in	Iraq	leader,	Jordanian-born	Abu	Musab	al-Zarqawi	–	against	Bin	Laden’s	advice	–	represented	a
turning	point	for	the	movement	which	profoundly	shaped	the	conflicts	in	Iraq,	and	later	Syria.
Affirming	that	transnational	identity	politics	drive	instability	and	contribute	towards	the	outbreak	of	conflict	is	quite
different	from	positing	that	group	differences	in	themselves	cause	conflict	(as	proposed	in	Huntington’s	‘Clash	of
Civilizations’	thesis).	Gartzke	&	Skrede	Gleditsch,	for	instance,	note	that	‘violence	is	more	likely	among	states	with
similar	cultural	ties,	even	when	controlling	for	other	determinants	of	conflict’	(2006:	53).	And	while	their	study	refers
to	conflicts	between	rather	than	within	states,	others	have	similarly	disputed	that	ethnic	diversity	is	a	causal	driver	of
civil	war	(e.g.	Fearon	&	Laitin	2001;	Fox	2003).	So	while	conflicts	do	often	occur	between	groups	espousing
different	identities,	religious,	ethnic	and	linguistic	diversity	within	societies	is	far	more	common	than	conflict.	What
seems	much	more	important	to	understand	is	how,	amongst	an	infinite	possible	number	of	differences,	a	few
become	salient	(Bateson	1979:	98).
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Entrepreneurs	of	identity	politics	do	not	simply	appeal	to	pre-existing	categories	of	identity-based	groups;	they
interpellate	identities,	imbuing	them	with	values	and	beliefs.		In	a	2015	article	on	Identity	and	Ideology	in	Political
Violence	and	Conflict,	Jonathan	Leader	Maynard	challenges	crude	representations	of	identity	rooted	in	‘ancient
hatreds’	as	a	driver	of	conflict.	He	argues	that	‘identity	construction	is…	about	the	ideological	conversion	of	certain
lines	of	difference	into	politically	and	psychologically	relevant	axes.’	On	this	basis,	he	suggests	six	mutually
reinforcing	causal	mechanisms	through	which	identity	can	encourage	violence:	mobilization	coordinates;	targeting
categories;	virtue	systems;	obligation	hierarchies;	victimhood	and	group	hatred.
In	effect,	while	differences	in	themselves	are	not	cause	for	violence,	they	provide	a	means	by	which	to	strategise
violence.		Drawing	from	conflicts	in	the	modern	Middle	East,	below	are	a	few	examples	of	how	variations	of	pan-
Arabism,	pan-Islamism,	and	latterly	sectarianism	have	been	rhetorically	deployed	by	regional	actors	in	the	ways
suggested	by	Maynard	to	invoke	or	justify	conflict.
The	Six-Day	War	(1967):	At	the	height	of	Arab	nationalism	and	in	the	lead	up	to	the	second	Arab–Israeli	War	in
1967,	Egyptian	President	Gamal	‘Abdul	Nasser	used	the	Sawt	Al-Arab	radio	station	to	espouse	pan-Arabism
across	the	Middle	East	in	support	of	liberating	Palestine	.	The	station’s	broadcasting	was	designed	to	mobilise
popular	sentiment	against	Israel	and	the	imperial	powers	backing	it,	and	to	use	the	Zionist	label	as	a	targeting
category	justifying	group	hatred	against	Israel,	advocating	‘the	extermination	of	Zionism	in	the	second	round	of	the
Palestinian	war’.
Iran–Iraq	War	(1980–88):	Using	the	rhetoric	of	Arab	unity,	the	Iraqi	Ba’ath	party	leadership	cited	the	large
ethnically	Arab	population	in	the	south-western	oil-producing	Iranian	province	of	Khuzestan	as	a	justification	for
their	invasion.	Conversely,	Iranian	Supreme	leader	Ayatollah	Khomeini	appealed	to	the	virtue	system	of	pan-
Islamism	to	justify	prolonging	the	war	after	the	initial	Iraqi	invasion	had	been	repelled.	At	the	same	time,	however,
both	sides	also	appealed	to	their	own	populations	to	remain	loyal	to	the	state,	and	in	practice,	calls	for	national
identity	carried	most	weight.
Soviet–Afghan	War	(1979–89):		The	radical	Sunni	strand	of	pan-Islamism	gained	considerable	traction	across	the
Middle	East	as	a	result	of	the	Soviet–Afghan	War.	Palestinian	scholar	Abdullah	Yusuf	‘Azzam,	so-called	‘Father	of
Global	Jihad’,	issued	a	fatwa	when	Soviet	forces	invaded	Afghanistan	declaring	‘defensive	jihad’	in	Afghanistan	a
personal	obligation	for	all	Muslims.	‘Azzam	identified	an	obligation	hierarchy	for	foreign	mujahideen:	he	told	them
that	while	they	should	consider	jihad	in	Palestine	their	highest	duty,	due	to	the	practical	difficulties	of	accessing
Palestine,	they	should	instead	come	to	Afghanistan	to	fight	the	invaders.
Israel–Hezbollah	War	(2006):	Despite	the	widely	mooted	demise	of	pan-Arabism	after	the	defeat	of	the	Arab
armies	at	the	hands	of	Israeli	forces	in	1967,	pan-Arab	sentiment	was	strong	in	the	light	of	Hezbollah’s	war	against
Israel	in	2006.	Despite	attempts	by	the	Egyptian,	Jordanian	and	Saudi	leaderships	to	discredit	it,	Hezbollah	gained
enormous	(albeit	temporary)	popularity	across	the	Arab	world	by	stressing	its	Arabness	(as	opposed	to	its
Shi’aness)	and	by	raising	the	status	of	the	(Sunni)	Palestinians	as	victims	of	an	oppressive	Zionist	force.
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Mujahideen	in	the	Afghan-Soviet	war.
The	examples	above	point	to	instances	of	politicising	Arab	and	Islamic	identities	in	the	ways	suggested	by	Maynard
in	order	to	invoke	or	justify	conflict.	They	also	suggest	that	attempts	to	leverage	ideologically	informed	identities	on
a	transnational	scale	are	often	unsuccessful.	Even	if	they	are	initially	persuasive,	over	time	the	ideology	justifying
differentiating	between	identities	may	lose	pertinence	or	credibility,	even	if	its	effect	of	fracturing	communities	is
seemingly	irreversible.
And	yet,	despite	the	fact	that	entrepreneurs	of	identity	politics	–	particularly	when	they	are	ruling	elites	–	often
appear	to	be	‘exposed’	as	insincere,	the	underlying	sources	of	identity	recur	again	and	again	in	the	region’s
conflicts.	The	example	of	the	2006	Lebanon	War	demonstrates	that	Arabism,	while	it	may	have	evolved,	is	not
‘dead’:	it	can	be	effectively	revived	to	popular	acclaim	so	long	as	the	main	‘enemy’	at	hand	is	neither	Arab	nor
Muslim.
Several	factors	have	led	to	the	current	move	of	ruling	elites	away	from	sectarian	politics.	They	include	the	much
touted	‘end	of	ISIS’,	the	increased	Russian	influence	in	Syria	and	corresponding	reduction	of	Iranian	and
Hezbollah’s	influence,	and	the	rupture	of	the	Sunni	front	following	the	diplomatic	rift	between	Qatar	and	Saudi.	In	a
new	rhetorical	battle	carried	by	Arab	satellite	channels,	Qatar	has	dropped	anti-Iranian	narratives	in	favour	of	a
campaign	against	the	alleged	hypocrisy	of	the	Saudi	monarchy’s	authoritarian	brand	of	Wahhabism.	The	Saudi
media,	on	the	other	hand,	is	maintaining	an	onslaught	against	Iran	but	also	attacking	Qatar’s	continued	sympathies
and	sponsorship	of	jihadi	‘terrorist’	groups	–	by	which	it	primarily	means	the	Muslim	Brotherhood.
This	change	of	direction,	however,	should	not	be	read	as	evidence	that	sectarianism	has	been	‘defeated’.	Rather,	it
is	indicative	of	political	actors’	constant	reassessment	of	the	regional	–	and	the	domestic	–	threat	environment,	in
which	different	brands	of	identity	are	brought	into	focus	to	address	different	types	of	enemy.		Ultimately,	ruling	elites
in	the	Middle	East	have	recurrent	recourse	to	identity	politics	because	of	their	own	legitimacy	deficits;	and	so	long
as	these	deficits	prevail,	there	is	little	prospect	of	a	transnational	language	of	participatory	politics	emerging.
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